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A NOTE ON TREND-SPOTTING IN THE
CASE LAW
KEITH N. HYLTON*
Professor Robert Hillman tells us that he "will not try to resolve
. . . whether we should be enthusiastic or lament the recent judicial
trend to apply rules that favor written contracts."' This is a refreshingly
non-dogmatic approach in a field where scholars are continually as-
serting reasons to celebrate or lament some new judicial trend. More-
over, Professor Hillman, again admirably in my view, is not even sure
such a trend exists. If there is a trend in favor of written contracts,
however, he believes that it has resulted because (I) "judicial decisions
applying private law reflect changes in public opinion," 2 and (2) public
opinion has grown "more distrustful of big government, more wary of
nondemocratic institutions such as the judiciary, and more respectful
of market exchange."3
I like this style of argument. Professor Hillman has framed the
more controversial part of his thesis in a careful, conditional manner,
and stops along the way at several points to identify the empirical
issues. The argument's level of generality gives me little reason to fear
that Professor Hillman is trying to enlist me in a private, quixotic effort
to change the law to suit his normative vision. In short, I was initially
receptive to Professor Hillman's argument because it respects my
autonomy, giving me room to go my own way on the normative issues—
such as whether one should celebrate or lament the trend in favor of
written contracts.
Still, I disagree with Professor Hillman's thesis, even at this level
of generality. I think it buys too heavily into an unproven and probably
mistaken conception of legal change that is orthodox in the legal
academy and common in public opinion. We should admit that the
orthodox view of legal change is unsupported by evidence, and recog-
nize that it probably has a harmful effect on legal scholarship and the
legal profession generally.
* Professor of Law, Boston University; A.B. 1982, Harvard College; Ph.D. (Economics) 1986
Massachusetts Institute of Technology; J.D. 1989, Harvard Law School.
Robert A. Hillman, The New Conservatism in Contract Law and the Process of Legal Change,
40 B.C. L. REv. qqq, qqq (1999).
2 Id. at qqq.
3 Id. at qqq.
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I. THE ORTHODOX VIEW OF LEGAL CHANGE
The orthodox view, as I see it, is made up of two parts. The first
is an assumption that legal change occurs through the conscious effort
or action of judges. It is important, according to this view, to know
judges' predispositions, to get inside their heads, in order to predict
the direction of legal change. A strong version of this theory holds that
judges act as representatives of their economic class, so that judges who
are members of the economic elite will tend to hand down decisions
that favor the elite; for example, they will decide cases in a way that
favors the owners of capital over laborers. Perhaps the best-known
illustration of this theory is the claim—advanced by Horwitz 4 and
others5—that the negligence rule was fashioned during the nineteenth
century by judges who wanted to subsidize emerging industry. A
weaker version of this theory, consistent with Professor Hillman's ar-
gument, holds that changes in public opinion play a role in deciding
cases because judges absorb public opinion. Judges, therefore, cannot
avoid deciding cases in ways that reflect dominant opinions.
The second part of the orthodox view is an assumption that, in
the absence of judicial action moving the law in a particular direction,
the law changes or develops in a neutral fashion. Accordingly, in the
absence of judicial effort, we should not observe significant trends that
favor one economic or social class over another. Indeed, we really
should not observe doctrinal trends of any sort. If, in difficult cases
(which are the only cases that are likely to spend a lot of time in court)
judges have no reason to prefer one set of rules (e.g., rules favoring a
written contract) over another, we should not expect to see outcomes
that favor a particular set of rules. According to this view, the negli-
gence rule never would have materialized if nineteenth century judges
had been uninterested in using the law to aid owners of capital.
Lawyers are not accustomed to speaking explicitly in statistical
terms. I think it helps clarify the argument, however, to introduce some
statistical reasoning in this description of the orthodox position. Think
of the law as an object moving along a path. The object can stay along
a straight course or move over time to the right or to the left. If the
object follows a "random walk," then it is equally likely to move one
4 MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860,85-99 (1977).
5 While the subsidization thesis has become connected with Horwitz's book, the argument
was suggested earlier by Charles Gregory in his article Thespass, to Negligence, to Absolute Liability,
37 VA. L. REV. 359 (1951). For the most impressive historical refutation of the subsidization thesis,
see Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A Reinterpretation,




step to the right as it is to move one step to the left. 6 Over time, the
average or expected position of an object moving according to a
random walk remains the same. Because it is equally likely to move to
either side, we should expect a sample of one hundred steps to include
fifty steps to the right and fifty steps to the left, leaving the object at
its initial position. The random walk is often illustrated with the de-
scription of a drunk walking through a park.
The orthodox view assumes that the law follows a neutral, random-
walk evolutionary path so long as judges do not actively attempt to
move the law in a particular direction. Accordingly, a trend under this
view will emerge randomly, if at all, and eventually will be overcome
by a trend in the opposite direction. Although this view does not rule
out the possibility of a substantial trend in the case law in a particular
direction, it does indicate that substantial trends will be observed quite
infrequently—as infrequently, for example, as we would expect to
observe twenty heads in a row in a game of tossing coins.
II. ALTERNATIVE EVOLUTIONARY MODEL
In contrast to this orthodox view, I want to offer an alternative,
evolutionary model that relies entirely on the trial selection process to
explain trends in the case law. Neutral, random-walk evolution is cap-
tured adequately by the trial-selection model of Priest and Klein,?
According to Priest and Klein, the disputes that are litigated all the way
to judgment are those in which the law is most uncertain, where the
outcome is very much like a coin toss. If the law is relatively clear, the
parties are likely to settle, because the divergence between the plain-
tiffs and the defendant's expectations of the trial outcome will be
negligible. Because trials are as uncertain as coin tosses, under the
Priest-Klein model, the percentage of trials won by plaintiffs will be
roughly fifty percent. As a result, we should expect to see random-walk
evolution in the case law; that is, we should observe few significant
trends in judicial decisions.
Note that I have said nothing about the predispositions of judges.
If such predispositions are observable, the neutral evolution implied
by Priest and Klein should be observed nonetheless. Why? If everyone
6 For an explanation of the random-walk process, see 1 RICHARD P. FEYNMAN ET AL., THE
FEYNMAN LECTURES ON PHYSICS 6-7 (1963).
7 George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD.
6-12 (1984). For further discussion of the connection between the Priest-Klein model and
"random walk" case law evolution, see Keith N. Hylton, Fee Shifting and Predictability of Law, 71
Cm-KENT L. REV. 427, 436-40 (1995) (symposium on fee shifting),
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knows that judges are favoring a certain type of litigant—say they want
to subsidize a particular industry—the cases that are likely to be de-
cided in accordance with this well-known bias will settle early. Only
those cases in which the judicial predisposition is unclear will be
litigated all the way to judgment and possibly appealed. Judicial atti-
tudes or predispositions are, therefore, irrelevant under this view.
I want to rely on this model and build on it. It happens to be
inadequate in my view, because there are many areas of litigation in
which plaintiff win rates fall substantially below the fifty percent level
predicted by Priest and Klein. In view of this shortcoming, I want to
modify the Priest-Klein model.
Several years ago, I offered a modification that, in my opinion,
sufficiently explains the patterns of non-neutral evolution actually ob-
served.' Under the "asymmetric information" model, the litigant who
has less information about the legal standard is likely to lose more
frequently in court. Thus, if the plaintiff tends to have less information
about the relevant legal standard than does the defendant, the average
plaintiff win rate will be less than fifty percent. For example, if the
typical malpractice plaintiff has less information about the relevant
legal standard than does the defendant—which is plausible since ap-
plication of the negligent care standard requires facts that are exclu-
sively in the hands of the defendant physician—then plaintiff win rates
should fall well below fifty percent in malpractice litigation. Empirical
data confirm this prediction.°
This is a good point to set out clearly the alternative to the
orthodox model of legal change. As explained above, if litigants are
equally informed as to the relevant legal standard, the law will follow
a neutral, random-walk evolutionary path. This implies that we should
observe significant doctrinal trends favoring one particular class of
litigant over another quite infrequently. On the other hand, if litigants
are unequally informed as to the relevant legal standard, the law will
not follow a neutral, random-walk path. In particular, the law will follow
a biased path that seemingly favors the better informed party. 1° The
8 See Keith N. Hylton, Asymmetric Information and the Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 22 J.
LEGAL Slim 187 (1993).
9 See id. at 200-03. Priest and Klein, I should note, offer an alternative explanation of
non-neutral evolution. They argue that if one of the parties has much more at stake than the
other, the party who has more at stake will tend to win more often. However, I have argued that
the evidence is generally inconsistent with this argument. See id. at 203.
10 The better informed party is one who has the most accurate prediction of the likely
outcome of a trial. Greater accuracy may result from better information regarding the relevant
legal standard or from better information regarding the important facts of the dispute.
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law will continue to follow this biased path until rough informational
equality is attained, at which point the random-walk path should be
observed.
It is important to note that nothing in this alternative theory relies
on the predispositions or attitudes of judges, as long as these attitudes
are known by all litigants. In other words, judicial attitudes are irrele-
vant in the evolutionary model.
III. SOME IMPLICATIONS
Except for exceptional cases—such as those decided by the Su-
preme Court—the evidence from routine litigation does not support
the orthodox view. Plaintiff win rates in malpractice and products
liability litigation are well below fifty percent,n and the appeals gener-
ated by these cases often produce case law that favors defendants.
Although some authors have suggested that recent pro-defendant
products liability case law reflects a new judicial attitude,' 2 I find this
explanation unpersuasive, particularly in the medical malpractice are-
na. In my view, the plaintiff win rate statistics and case law trends are
too stable to reflect changes in judicial attitudes. They are also too
common to reflect judicial attitudes, because it is unlikely that these
attitudes are the same in all jurisdictions across the country. Finally,
the notion that judges have deliberately set out to provide special
protective legal rules for physicians and product manufacturers strikes
me as implausible on its face. Judges, as a group, have no identifiable
reason to run interference for these two particular interest groups
through the case law.
In addition to its lack of supporting evidence, the orthodox posi-
tion encourages a negative view of the courts and the legal profession,
and probably has a harmful effect on legal scholarship. This is a bit of
a paradox, because the popular view of law, as something shaped by
the hands of thoughtful judges, is in part a by-product of efforts in the
popular press to humanize institutions. Thus corporations are de-
scribed as extensions of some aggressive chief executive officer. Given
this approach, it only makes sense to treat the law as the product of
aggressive judicial activism, as if judges operate without constraints.
The negative implication of this view, however, is that the law is in-
11 See id, at 200-03.
" See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products
Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L Rev. 479 (1990).
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finitely manipulable, because it is entirely dependent on the person-
alities and attitudes of judges.
Legal scholars, buying into this orthodox view, write articles in
which they identify a certain trend in the case law, such as the devel-
opment of the negligence rule in the nineteenth century, and argue
that it reflects an effort by judges to subsidize a particular interest
group. Scholars are discouraged from trying to understand the com-
plex process that generates case law trends because the greater payoff
awaits those who present simple explanations based on judicial atti-
tudes.
I would not make these complaints against Professor Hillman,
because he is too careful to fall prey to these criticisms. Still, I think
the better approach is to steer clear of the orthodox position. We must
take case law trends seriously, but we need a deeper understanding of
them than we have now.
